jueves, 19 de julio de 2012

CFP: Vardande - Revista Electrónica de Semiótica y Fenomenología Jurídica

Por Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora (jorgefabraz@gmail.com)

I VARDANDE Revista Electrónica de Semiótica y Fenomenología Jurídicases una publicación semestral que contiene artículos y ensayos inéditos sobre temas de derecho, filosofía del derecho, cultura legal, enseñanza superior del derecho, sistemas judiciales, administración de justicia y política jurisdiccional, desarrollados a partir de los marcos metodológicos y/o teóricos que nos ofrecen la semiótica y la fenomenología en sus distintas áreas de reflexión.

I VARDANDE Revista Electrónica de Semiótica y Fenomenología Jurídicases una revista científica internacional de libre acceso dirigida al público de lengua latina y congrega en su equipo editorial a expertos y profesionales de América y Europa.

Entidad Editora:

Asociación Brasileña de Jóvenes Abogados ABJA
Av. Río Branco Nº 26, Sobreloja, Conjunto 28, Centro, Río de Janeiro
Teléfono/Fax: 55 (21) 35410327
Correo-e: abja@abja.com.br

Editor Responsable:

Héctor Luis Pittman Villarreal
Calle El Rosal Mz. J Lote 11 Urb. Los Sauces, Segunda Etapa, Distrito de Surquillo, Lima 34 – Perú
Teléfono: (511) 271-1701
Correo-e: hector.pittman@pucp.edu.pe

viernes, 6 de julio de 2012

Bernal Pulido sobre el Test de Proporcionalidad (de Iureamicorum)

Por Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora (jorgefabraz@gmail.com)

Les comparto el último post del Gonzalo Ramírez Cleves sobre Derecho a la Carta No. 14. En esta ocasión, una entevista del Carlos Bernal Pulido sobre el texto de proporcionalidad. (Fuente)

Recomendado.

Derecho a la Carta No 14. El Test de proporcionalidad y sus críticos con Carlos Bernal Pulido






En Derecho a la Carta No 14 el profesor Carlos Bernal Pulido nos habla del Test de Proporcionalidad y sus críticos. Entrevistan Xiomara Romero, Federico Suárez, Juan David Bazzani y Gonzal Ramírez. Espero lo disfruten.
 

jueves, 5 de julio de 2012

Congreso de Filosofía del Derecho

Por Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora (jorgefabraz@gmail.com)

Les anexo la convocatoria del congreso nacional. El vínculo, aquí.

Seminario de Filosofía del Derecho (Loja)

Por Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora (jorgefabraz@gmail.com)

Un Congreso de Filosofía del Derecho, en Ecuador.



El Departamento de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas de la Universidad Técnica Particular de Loja hace extensiva la invitación al Seminario Internacional de Filosofía del Derecho y Argumentación Jurídica, que se llevará a cabo del 23 al 26 de julio del presente.

A continuación ubicamos la agenda:


Lunes 23 de Julio

17:00 Tendencias contemporáneas de la filosofía del derecho
Imer B. Flores, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

18:00 Contemporary Tendencies on Legal Philosophy: Inclusive v. Exclusive Legal Positivism
Kenneth E. Himma, Seattle Pacific University (EUA)

19:00 Cuando el Derecho Privado se encuentra con la Filosofía del Derecho
Jorge Fabra, McMaster University ( Canadá)

20:00 Panel de preguntas


Martes 24 de Julio

De 08:00 a 12:00 y de 15:00 a 19:00 Argumentación Jurídica e Interpretación. Taller intensivo con casos prácticos de 8 horas.
Imer B. Flores, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México


Miércoles 25 de Julio

16:00 Argumentación, Cultura Jurídica y Facultades de Derecho.
Andrés Botero Bernal, Universidad de Medellín (Colombia)

17:00 Los problemas y la utilidad de la Filosofía del Derecho.
Jorge Fabra, McMaster University (Canadá)

18:00 Importance and Utility of Legal Philosophy and Conceptual Jurisprudence Nowadays
Kenneth E. Himma, Seattle Pacific University (EUA)

19:00 El mapa del pensamiento filosófico-jurídico en América Latina: el caso de México (vis à vis Ecuador)
Imer B. Flores, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

20:00 Panel de preguntas

Jueves 26 de Julio

De 08:00 a 12:00 y de 15:00 a 19:00 Argumentación Jurídica e Interpretación. Taller intensivo con resolución de casos prácticos de 8 horas.
Andrés Botero Bernal, Universidad de Medellín (Colombia)


Para inscribirse al mismo pueden cocactarse con la secretaría del Departamento de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas de la UTPL. vmordonez@utpl.edu.ec  Teléfono: 2 570 - 275 ext. 2731

Convocatoria Revista Prolegómonos

Por Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora (jorgefabraz@gmail.com)

 Una convocatoriaL

Bogotá D.C., 4 de julio de 2012
 Estimados Señores:

La RevistaProlegómenos - Derechos y Valores es una publicación periódica con númerossemestrales cuyo objetivo es hacer visibles los productos de investigacióntanto institucionales como de otras entidades afines con la disciplina.
El público al cual vadirigido son profesionales del Derecho, estudiantes e instituciones de ordennacional e internacional (públicas y privadas) relacionadas con las diferentesáreas del Derecho.
El Centro deInvestigaciones de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Militar NuevaGranada, organizador de la Revista PROLEGÓMENOS Derechos y Valores, invita alos estudiantes, docentes e investigadores nacionales e internacionales vinculadoscon el desarrollo del pensamiento jurídico y socio jurídico a presentarartículos para su publicación enviándolos ANTES DEL 11 DE AGOSTO DE 2012, bajo el cumplimiento de los siguientescriterios:
Sólo se publicarántrabajos originales e inéditos. El idioma oficial de la revista es el español.Los artículos que estén escritos en inglés se publicarán en ese mismo idioma.Se consideran inéditos aquellos que ya hayan sido publicados en otros idiomas yse traduzcan por primera vez al español.
Una vez que se acepteun trabajo, los autores deberán ceder el derecho de autor al Centro deInvestigaciones políticas, jurídicas y sociales de la Facultad de Derecho de laUniversidad Militar Nueva Granada.
Demás detalles yrequisitos en documento adjunto.

Agradecemos suatención y esperamos contar con su participación.

Cordialmente,

ANDRÉS GONZÁLEZ SERRANO
Editor Revista Prolegómenos Derechosy Valores
__._,_.___
Archivos adjuntos de =?ISO-8859-1?Q?REVISTA_PROLEG=D3MENOS_DERECHOS_Y_VALORES?=
Archivo 1 de 1

martes, 3 de julio de 2012

Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy

Por Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora (jorgefabraz@gmail.com)

Aquí un nuevo Journal.



Search articles of Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy
Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy Rss

Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy

'The Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy (NJLP) is an international peer reviewed journal, devoted to the study of legal philosophy and jurisprudence and to the foundations of legal sciences in the broad sense of the term (sociology of law, anthropology of law etc.). This title was formerly known as ‘Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie’.

Please contact the editorial board via Stefan Rummens; stefan.rummens@hiw.kuleuven.be.

NJLP accepts both Dutch and English articles. The journal is accessible through www.bjutijdschriften.nl (in Dutch) and www.elevenjournals.com (in English).
Articles are online accessible for free (Open Access) after a period of six months.

Subscription prices

Please click here for the subscription prices of this journal

Extra material

Sample article
Guidelines for authors (English version)
Guidelines for authors (Dutch version)

Editorial board

M. Goodwin, M. Hildebrandt (editor in chief), A.R. Mackor, R. Pierik, S.M.E. Rummens (secretary), R. Schwitters, C.E. Smith, J.E. Soeharno, and B. Wolthuis (reviews)

Aún menos que nada?

Por Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora (jorgefabraz@gmail.com)

Aquí les dejo un acalorado debate en Zizek (desconozco como hacer los símbolos correspondientes) y algunos críticos. No voy a opinar no solo porque no se mucho de artes ocultas, sino que he estado ocupado finalizando mi tesis.

Primero, el Review de Jonathan Rée en The Guardian: (Jun. 27/2011)

Less Than Nothing by Slavoj Žižek – review

A march through Slavoj Žižek's 'masterwork'
Slavoj Žižek
Slavoj Žižek: total leftist. Photograph: David Levene for the Guardian
The Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek has thousands of devoted fans, and it's easy to see why. He is cheeky, voluble and exuberant, and over the past 30 years he has turned high theory into performance art. He was born in communist Yugoslavia in 1949, and received a thorough grounding in Marxism and the principles of "dialectical materialism". In 1971 he got a job in philosophy at the University of Ljubljana, only to be dismissed two years later for being "un-Marxist". After a stretch of military service, he resumed his academic work and spent a few years in Paris with followers of the surrealistic psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. In the 80s he adopted English as his working language and launched himself on an international career as a taboo-busting radical theorist.
  1. Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism
  2. by Slavoj Zizek
  3. Buy it from the Guardian bookshop
  1. Tell us what you think: Star-rate and review this book
Žižek is a gifted speaker – tumultuous, emphatic, direct and paradoxical – and he writes as he speaks. He has 50 books already to his credit, and plenty more on the way. His easy familiarity with the philosophical classics may leave some readers gasping for air, but he offers plenty of lifelines in the form of anecdotes, laddish jokes and inexhaustible references to popular culture. And he can always redeem himself, in the eyes of his admirers, by lashing out at multiculturalism, toleration, dialogue and other "liberal sacred cows". He has become the saint of total leftism: a quasi-divine being, than whom none more radical can ever be conceived.
Of course he relies on a formula: to be Žižekian is to hold that Freudian psychoanalysis is essentially correct, and that its implications are absolutely revolutionary. But Žižek's Freud is not everyone's. Old-fashioned Freudians believe that we have masses of juicy secrets locked up inside us, unacknowledged by our well-ordered rational consciousness and clamouring to be set free. For Žižek, however, as for Lacan before him, Freud's great insight was that everything about us – our vaunted rationality as much as our unavowable impulses – is soaked with craziness and ambivalence all the way through.
"The first choice has to be the wrong choice," as Žižek says in his monumental new book, because "the wrong choice creates the conditions for the right choice". There is no such thing as being wholly in the right, or wholly in the wrong; and this principle applies to politics as much as to personal life. Politics, as Žižek understands it, is a rare and splendid thing: no actions are genuinely political unless they are revolutionary, and revolution is not revolution unless it institutes "true change" – the kind of comprehensive makeover that "sets its own standards" and "can only be measured by criteria that result from it". Genuine revolutionaries are not interested in operating on "the enemy's turf", haggling over various strategies for satisfying pre-existing needs or securing pre-existing rights: they want to break completely with the past and create "an opening for the truly New". Authentic revolutions have often been betrayed, but as far as Žižek is concerned, they are never misconceived.
Žižek refuses to indulge in sanctimonious regrets over the failings of 20th-century communism. He has always had a soft spot for Stalin, and likes to tell the story of Uncle Joe's response when asked which of two deviations was worse: both of them are worse, he said, with perfect Lacanian panache. Žižek's objection to Stalinism is not that it involved terror and mass murder, but that it sought to justify them by reference to a happy communist tomorrow: the trouble with Soviet communism, as he puts it, is "not that it is too immoral, but that it is secretly too moral". Hitler elicits similar even-handedness: the unfortunate Führer was "trapped within the horizon of bourgeois society", Žižek says, and the "true problem of nazism" was "not that it went too far … but that it did not go far enough".
In the past few years Žižek has grown bored with the "shitty politics" that made him famous, and Less Than Nothing – which he describes as "my true life's work" – is meant to provide a comprehensive philosophical justification for the attitudes he likes to strike. The germ of the book is a joke about a Jew applying to leave the Soviet Union. "I'm worried that communism is going to collapse, and we Jews will get the blame," Rabinovitch explains. "No need to worry," says the official. "Communism is here to stay." To which Rabinovitch replies, with sudden frankness: "Quite so, and that's my other reason." The truth, in short, emerges only in the wake of muddle and deceit.
Žižek celebrates the wisdom of Rabinovitch through a massive retelling of the entire history of western philosophy, beginning in ancient Greece, passing through 19th-century Germany, and ending with various oddballs he has met on the conference circuit, and a few louts engaged in what he calls "Žižek-bashing". The narrative is focused on Hegel, who understood better than anyone else how all our truths incorporate the errors and delusions from which they emerged. Hegel realised, as Žižek likes to put it, that radical change "retroactively posits its own presuppositions" – in other words, that it alters the past as well as the future – and this means, apparently, that he was a better "dialectical materialist" than Marx could ever be.
Sad bookworms such as me, with rows of ragged volumes of Hegel and Marx on our shelves, will find plenty of well-made points in these pages, but many readers may find themselves lapsing into baffled torpor. Even if you are attracted by Žižek's Hegelian fundamentalism, you are bound to wonder how it connects with his spectacular radicalism. After all it never led Hegel in that direction: he was notoriously timid about political change. And if we accept that there is no truth without error, we may well conclude that it is better to cling to the habits that were good enough for our ancestors than to stake the happiness of future generations on a gamble with incalculable stakes and uncertain prizes.
You may also wonder why Žižek spends so much time talking about philosophers, rather than talking about the things they talked about, let alone the things they neglected or ignored. No doubt he picked up the habit from Hegel; but Hegel was quite explicit about treating the philosophical canon not as a collection of strange books by idiosyncratic authors but as a single unified masterpiece composed by "the one living spirit". Philosophy, as Hegel conceived it, was rather like the Old and New Testaments as seen by evangelical Christians – an epitome of everything that can ever happen in the world, encompassing all we know, and all we need to know. For Hegel, there was no theoretical problem that could not be resolved – by proxy, so to speak – through an all-embracing commentary on philosophy's past.
Two hundred years later, Hegel's view of philosophy is at best a magnificent ruin, and no one can believe in it any more. Except Žižek, that is. He still has faith in "the unity of philosophy", and imagines that he is being profoundly political as he spends tens of thousands of words explaining what Plato really meant, or what is "truly materialist", "authentically Hegelian" or "properly apocalyptic". He never discusses poverty, inequality, war, finance, childcare, intolerance, crime, education, famine, nationalism, medicine, climate change, or the production of goods and services, yet he takes himself to be grappling with the most pressing social issues of our time. He is happy to leave the world to burn while he plays his games of philosophical toy soldiers.
Less than Nothing is marketed as Žižek's "masterwork" and a "true work of love", but it won't give much pleasure even to his fans. His talent for brief intellectual entertainments does not carry over into longer literary forms – let alone this "mega-book", as he calls it, which goes on considerably longer than War and Peace. He does not seem to realise that the purpose of a long book is to build steadily to a culminating revelation, rather than to go on and on until it stops, leaving the argument exactly where it was at the beginning. In the past I have found it hard to dislike Žižek, but after a month's forced march through Less Than Nothing it seems to be getting easier.
• Jonathan Rée's books include I See a Voice (Flamingo)

El segundo de John Gray en New York Review of books (Julio 12 de 2012, pero fue posteado en julio 1)

The Violent Visions of Slavoj Žižek

July 12, 2012

John Gray

Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism
by Slavoj Žižek
Verso, 1,038 pp., $69.95                                                  
Living in the End Times
by Slavoj Žižek
Verso, 504 pp., $22.95 (paper)                                                  
gray_1-071212.jpg
Slavoj Žižek at his apartment in Ljubljana, Slovenia, 2010
Few thinkers illustrate the contradictions of contemporary capitalism better than the Slovenian philosopher and cultural theorist Slavoj Žižek. The financial and economic crisis has demonstrated the fragility of the free market system that its defenders believed had triumphed in the cold war; but there is no sign of anything resembling the socialist project that in the past was seen by many as embodying capitalism’s successor. Žižek’s work, which reflects this paradoxical situation in a number of ways, has made him one of the world’s best-known public intellectuals.
Born and educated in Ljubljana, the capital of the People’s Republic of Slovenia in the former Yugoslav federation until the federal state began to break up and Slovenia declared independence in 1990, Žižek has held academic positions in Britain, America, and Western Europe as well as in Slovenia. His prodigious output (over sixty volumes since his first book in English, The Sublime Object of Ideology, was published in 1989), innumerable articles and interviews, together with films such as Žižek! (2005) and The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema (2006), have given him a presence that extends far beyond the academy. Well attuned to popular culture, particularly film, he has a following among young people in many countries, including those of post-Communist Europe. He has a journal dedicated to his work—International Journal of Žižek Studies, founded in 2007—whose readership is registered via Facebook, and in October 2011 he addressed members of the Occupy movement in Zuccotti Park in New York, an event that was widely reported and can be viewed on YouTube.
Žižek’s wide influence does not mean that his philosophical and political standpoint can be easily defined. A member of the Communist Party of Slovenia until he resigned in 1988, Žižek had difficult relations with the Party authorities for many years owing to his interest in what they viewed as heterodox ideas. In 1990 he stood as a presidential candidate for Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, a party of the center left that was the dominant political force in the country for the rest of the decade; but liberal ideas, aside from serving as a reference point for positions he rejects, have never shaped his thinking.
Žižek was dismissed from his first university teaching post in the early 1970s, when the Slovenian authorities judged a thesis he had written on French structuralism—then an influential movement in anthropology, linguistics, psychoanalysis, and philosophy claiming that human thought and behavior exemplify a universal system of interrelated principles—to be “non-Marxist.” The episode demonstrated the limited nature of the intellectual liberalization that was being promoted in the country at the time, but Žižek’s later work suggests that the authorities were right in judging that his intellectual orientation was not Marxian. Throughout the enormous corpus of work he has since built up, Marx is criticized for being insufficiently radical in his rejection of existing modes of thought, while Hegel—a much greater influence on Žižek—is praised for being willing to lay aside classical logic in order to develop a more dialectical way of thinking. But Hegel is also criticized for having too great an attachment to traditional modes of reasoning, and a central theme of Žižek’s writings is the need to shed the commitment to intellectual objectivity that has guided radical thinkers in the past.
Žižek’s work sets itself in opposition to Marx on many issues. For all he owed to Hegelian metaphysics, Marx was also an empirical thinker who tried to frame theories about the actual course of historical development. It was not the abstract idea of revolution with which he was primarily concerned, but a revolutionary project involving specific and radical alterations in economic institutions and power relations.
Žižek shows little interest in these aspects of Marx’s thinking. Aiming “to repeat the Marxist ‘critique of political economy’ without the utopian-ideological notion of communism as its inherent standard,” he believes that “the twentieth-century communist project was utopian precisely insofar as it was not radical enough.” As Žižek sees it, Marx’s understanding of communism was partly responsible for this failure: “Marx’s notion of the communist society is itself the inherent capitalist fantasy; that is, a fantasmatic scenario for resolving the capitalist antagonisms he so aptly described.”
While he rejects Marx’s conception of communism, Žižek devotes none of the over one thousand pages of Less Than Nothing to specifying the economic system or institutions of government that would feature in a communist society of the kind he favors. In effect a compendium of Žižek’s work to date, Less Than Nothing is devoted instead to reinterpreting Marx by way of Hegel—one of the book’s sections is called “Marx as a Reader of Hegel, Hegel as a Reader of Marx”—and reformulating Hegelian philosophy by reference to the thought of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan.
A “post-structuralist” who rejected the belief that reality can be captured in language, Lacan also rejected the standard interpretation of Hegel’s idea of “the cunning of reason,” according to which world history is the realization by oblique and indirect means of reason in human life. For Lacan as Žižek summarizes him, “The Cunning of Reason…in no way involves a faith in a secret guiding hand guaranteeing that all the apparent contingency of unreason will somehow contribute to the harmony of the Totality of Reason: if anything, it involves a trust in un-Reason.” On this Lacanian reading, the message of Hegel’s philosophy is not the progressive unfolding of rationality in history but instead the impotence of reason.
The Hegel that emerges in Žižek’s writings thus bears little resemblance to the idealist philosopher who features in standard histories of thought. Hegel is commonly associated with the idea that history has an inherent logic in which ideas are embodied in practice and then left behind in a dialectical process in which they are transcended by their opposites. Drawing on the contemporary French philosopher Alain Badiou, Žižek radicalizes this idea of dialectic to mean the rejection of the logical principle of noncontradiction, so that rather than seeing rationality at work in history, Hegel rejects reason itself as it has been understood in the past. Implicit in Hegel (according to Žižek) is a new kind of “paraconsistent logic” in which a proposition “is not really suppressed by its negation.” This new logic, Žižek suggests, is well suited to understanding capitalism today. “Is not ‘postmodern’ capitalism an increasingly paraconsistent system,” he asks rhetorically, “in which, in a variety of modes, P is non-P: the order is its own transgression, capitalism can thrive under communist rule, and so on?”
Living in the End Times is presented by Žižek as being concerned with this situation. Summarizing the book’s central theme, he writes:
The underlying premise of the present book is a simple one: the global capitalist system is approaching an apocalyptic zero-point. Its “four riders of the apocalypse” are comprised by the ecological crisis, the consequences of the biogenetic revolution, imbalances within the system itself (problems with intellectual property; forthcoming struggles over raw materials, food and water), and the explosive growth of social divisions and exclusions.
With its sweeping claims and magniloquent rhetoric, this passage is typical of much in Žižek’s work. What he describes as the premise of the book is simple only because it passes over historical facts. Reading it, no one would suspect that, putting aside the killings of many millions for ideological reasons, some of the last century’s worst ecological disasters—the destruction of nature in the former Soviet Union and the devastation of the countryside during Mao’s Cultural Revolution, for example—occurred in centrally planned economies. Ecological devastation is not a result only of the economic system that exists in much of the world at the present time; while it may be true that the prevailing version of capitalism is unsustainable in environmental terms, there is nothing in the history of the past century that suggests the environment will be better protected if a socialist system is installed.
But to criticize Žižek for neglecting these facts is to misunderstand his intent, for unlike Marx he does not aim to ground his theorizing in a reading of history that is based in facts. “Today’s historical juncture does not compel us to drop the notion of the proletariat, or of the proletarian position—on the contrary, it compels us to radicalize it to an existential level beyond even Marx’s imagination,” he writes. “We need a more radical notion of the proletarian subject [i.e., the thinking and acting human being], a subject reduced to the evanescent point of the Cartesian cogito, deprived of its substantial content.” In Žižek’s hands, Marxian ideas—which in Marx’s materialist view were meant to designate objective social facts—become subjective expressions of revolutionary commitment. Whether such ideas correspond to anything in the world is irrelevant.
There is a problem at this point, however: Why should anyone adopt Žižek’s ideas rather than any others? The answer cannot be that Žižek’s are true in any traditional sense. “The truth we are dealing with here is not ‘objective’ truth,” Žižek writes, “but the self-relating truth about one’s own subjective position; as such, it is an engaged truth, measured not by its factual accuracy but by the way it affects the subjective position of enunciation.”
If this means anything, it is that truth is determined by reference to how an idea accords with the projects to which the speaker is committed—in Žižek’s case, a project of revolution. But this only poses the problem at another level: Why should anyone adopt Žižek’s project? The question cannot be answered in any simple way, since it is far from clear what Žižek’s revolutionary project consists in. He shows no signs of doubting that a society in which communism was realized would be better than any that has ever existed. On the other hand, he is unable to envision any circumstances in which communism might be realized: “Capitalism is not just a historical epoch among others…. Francis Fukuyama was right: global capitalism is ‘the end of history.’”1 Communism is not for Žižek—as it was for Marx—a realizable condition, but what Badiou describes as a “hypothesis,” a conception with little positive content but that enables radical resistance against prevailing institutions. Žižek is insistent that such resistance must include the use of terror:
Badiou’s provocative idea that one should reinvent emancipatory terror today is one of his most profound insights…. Recall Badiou’s exalted defense of Terror in the French Revolution, in which he quotes the justification of the guillotine for Lavoisier: “The Republic has no need for scientists.”2
Along with Badiou, Žižek celebrates Mao’s Cultural Revolution as “the last truly great revolutionary explosion of the twentieth century.” But he also regards the Cultural Revolution as a failure, citing Badiou’s conclusion that “the Cultural Revolution, even in its very impasse, bears witness to the impossibility truly and globally to free politics from the framework of the party-State.”3 Mao in encouraging the Cultural Revolution evidently should have found a way to break the power of the party-state. Again, Žižek praises the Khmer Rouge for attempting a total break with the past. The attempt involved mass killing and torture on a colossal scale; but in his view that is not why it failed: “The Khmer Rouge were, in a way, not radical enough: while they took the abstract negation of the past to the limit, they did not invent any new form of collectivity.” (Here and elsewhere the italics are Žižek’s.) A genuine revolution may be impossible in present circumstances, or any that can be currently imagined. Even so, revolutionary violence should be celebrated as “redemptive,” even “divine.”
While Žižek has described himself as a Leninist,4 there can be no doubt that this position would be anathema to the Bolshevik leader. Lenin had no qualms in using terror in order to promote the cause of communism (for him, a practically attainable objective). Always deployed as part of a political strategy, violence was instrumental in nature. In contrast, though Žižek accepts that violence has failed to achieve its communist goals and has no prospect of doing so, he insists that revolutionary violence has intrinsic value as a symbolic expression of rebellion—a position that has no parallel in either Marx or Lenin. A precedent may be seen in the work of the French psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, who defended the use of violence against colonialism as an assertion of the identity of subjects of colonial power; but Fanon viewed this violence as part of a struggle for national independence, an objective that was in fact achieved.
A clearer precedent can be found in the work of the early-twentieth-century French theorist of syndicalism Georges Sorel. In Reflections on Violence (1908), Sorel argued that communism was a utopian myth—but a myth that had value in inspiring a morally regenerative revolt against the corruption of bourgeois society. The parallels between this view and Žižek’s account of “redemptive violence” inspired by the “communist hypothesis” are telling.
A celebration of violence is one of the most prominent strands in Žižek’s work. He finds fault with Marx for thinking that violence can be justified as part of the conflict between objectively defined social classes. Class war must not be understood as “a conflict between particular agents within social reality: it is not a difference between agents (which can be described by means of a detailed social analysis), but an antagonism (‘struggle’) which constitutes these agents.” Applying this view when discussing Stalin’s assault on the peasantry, Žižek describes how the distinction between kulaks (rich peasants) and others became “blurred and unworkable: in a situation of generalized poverty, clear criteria no longer applied, and the other two classes of peasants often joined the kulaks in their resistance to forced collectivization.” In response to this situation the Soviet authorities introduced a new category, the sub-kulak, a peasant too poor to be classified as a kulak but who shared kulak values:
The art of identifying a kulak was thus no longer a matter of objective social analysis; it became a kind of complex “hermeneutics of suspicion,” of identifying an individual’s “true political attitudes” hidden beneath his or her deceptive public proclamations.
Describing mass murder in this way as an exercise in hermeneutics is repugnant and grotesque; it is also characteristic of Žižek’s work. He criticizes Stalin’s policy of collectivization, but not on account of the millions of human lives that were violently truncated or broken in its course. What Žižek criticizes is Stalin’s lingering attachment (however inconsistent or hypocritical) to “‘scientific’ Marxist terms.” Relying on “objective social analysis” for guidance in revolutionary situations is an error: “at some point, the process has to be cut short with a massive and brutal intervention of subjectivity: class belonging is never a purely objective social fact, but is always also the result of struggle and social engagement.” Rather than Stalin’s relentless use of torture and lethal force, it is the fact that he tried to justify the systematic use of violence by reference to Marxian theory that Žižek condemns.
Žižek’s rejection of anything that might be described as social fact comes together with his admiration of violence in his interpretation of Nazism. Commenting on the German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s much-discussed involvement with the Nazi regime, Žižek writes: “His involvement with the Nazis was not a simple mistake, but rather a ‘right step in the wrong direction.’” Contrary to many interpretations, Heidegger was not a radical reactionary. “Reading Heidegger against the grain, one discovers a thinker who was, at some points, strangely close to communism”—indeed, during the mid-Thirties, Heidegger might be described as “a future communist.”
If Heidegger mistakenly chose to back Hitler, the mistake was not in underestimating the violence that Hitler would unleash:
The problem with Hitler was that he was “not violent enough,” his violence was not “essential” enough. Hitler did not really act, all his actions were fundamentally reactions, for he acted so that nothing would really change, staging a gigantic spectacle of pseudo-Revolution so that the capitalist order would survive…. The true problem of Nazism is not that it “went too far” in its subjectivist-nihilist hubris of exercising total power, but that it did not go far enough, that its violence was an impotent acting-out which, ultimately, remained in the service of the very order it despised.
What was wrong with Nazism, it seems, is that—like the later experiment in total revolution of the Khmer Rouge—it failed to create any new kind of collective life. Žižek says little regarding the nature of the form of life that might have come into being had Germany been governed by a regime less reactive and powerless than he judges Hitler’s to have been. He does make plain that there would be no room in this new life for one particular form of human identity:
The fantasmatic status of anti- Semitism is clearly revealed by a statement attributed to Hitler: “We have to kill the Jew within us.” …Hitler’s statement says more than it wants to say: against his intentions, it confirms that the Gentiles need the anti-Semitic figure of the “Jew” in order to maintain their identity. It is thus not only that “the Jew is within us”—what Hitler fatefully forgot to add is that he, the anti-Semite, is also in the Jew. What does this paradoxical entwinement mean for the destiny of anti-Semitism?
Žižek is explicit in censuring “certain elements of the radical Left” for “their uneasiness when it comes to unambiguously condemning anti-Semitism.” But it is difficult to understand the claim that the identities of anti-Semites and Jewish people are in some way mutually reinforcing—which is repeated, word for word, in Less Than Nothing—except as suggesting that the only world in which anti-Semitism can cease to exist is one in which there are no longer any Jews.
Interpreting Žižek on this or any issue is not without difficulties. There is his inordinate prolixity, the stream of texts that no one could read in their entirety, if only because the torrent never ceases flowing. There is his use of a type of academic jargon featuring allusive references to other thinkers, which has the effect of enabling him to use language in an artful, hermetic way. As he acknowledges, Žižek borrows the term “divine violence” from Walter Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” (1921). It is doubtful whether Benjamin—a thinker who had important affinities with the Frankfurt School of humanistic Marxism—would have described the destructive frenzy of Mao’s Cultural Revolution or the Khmer Rouge as divine.
But this is beside the point, for by using Benjamin’s construction Žižek is able to praise violence and at the same time claim that he is speaking of violence in a special, recondite sense—a sense in which Gandhi can be described as being more violent than Hitler.5 And there is Žižek’s regular recourse to a laborious kind of clowning wordplay:
The…virtualization of capitalism is ultimately the same as that of the electron in particle physics. The mass of each elementary particle is composed of its mass at rest plus the surplus provided by the acceleration of its movement; however, an electron’s mass at rest is zero, its mass consists only of the surplus generated by the acceleration, as if we are dealing with a nothing which acquires some deceptive substance only by magically spinning itself into an excess of itself.
It is impossible to read this without recalling the Sokal affair in which Alan Sokal, a professor of physics, submitted a spoof article, “Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity,” to a journal of postmodern cultural studies. Equally, it is hard to read this and many similar passages in Žižek without suspecting that he is engaged—wittingly or otherwise—in a kind of auto-parody.
There may be some who are tempted to condemn Žižek as a philosopher of irrationalism whose praise of violence is more reminiscent of the far right than the radical left. His writings are often offensive and at times (as when he writes of Hitler being present “in the Jew”) obscene. There is a mocking frivolity in Žižek’s paeans to terror that recalls the Italian Futurist and ultra-nationalist Gabriele D’Annunzio and the Fascist (and later Maoist) fellow traveler Curzio Malaparte more than any thinker in the Marxian tradition. But there is another reading of Žižek, which may be more plausible, in which he is no more an epigone of the right than he is a disciple of Marx or Lenin.
Whether or not Marx’s vision of communism is “the inherent capitalist fantasy,” Žižek’s vision—which apart from rejecting earlier conceptions lacks any definite content—is well adapted to an economy based on the continuous production of novel commodities and experiences, each supposed to be different from any that has gone before. With the prevailing capitalist order aware that it is in trouble but unable to conceive of practicable alternatives, Žižek’s formless radicalism is ideally suited to a culture transfixed by the spectacle of its own fragility. That there should be this isomorphism between Žižek’s thinking and contemporary capitalism is not surprising. After all, it is only an economy of the kind that exists today that could produce a thinker such as Žižek. The role of global public intellectual Žižek performs has emerged along with a media apparatus and a culture of celebrity that are integral to the current model of capitalist expansion.
In a stupendous feat of intellectual overproduction Žižek has created a fantasmatic critique of the present order, a critique that claims to repudiate practically everything that currently exists and in some sense actually does, but that at the same time reproduces the compulsive, purposeless dynamism that he perceives in the operations of capitalism. Achieving a deceptive substance by endlessly reiterating an essentially empty vision, Žižek’s work—nicely illustrating the principles of paraconsistent logic—amounts in the end to less than nothing.
  1. 1Slavoj Žižek, “Have Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri Rewritten the Communist Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century?,” Rethinking Marxism: a Journal of Economics, Culture and Society , Vol. 13, No. 3–4 (2001), p. 190. 
  2. 2Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View ( MIT Press, 2006), p. 326. 
  3. 3Žižek, The Parallax View , p. 328. 
  4. 4I am a Leninist. Lenin wasn’t afraid to dirty his hands. If you can get power, grab it .” Quoted by Jonathan Derbyshire, New Statesman , October 29, 2009. 
  5. 5“It’s crucial to see violence which is done repeatedly to keep the things the way they are. In that sense, Gandhi was more violent than Hitler.” See Shobhan Saxena’s interview with Žižek, “ First they called me a joker, now I am a dangerous thinker ,” The Times of India , January 10, 2010. 
Y, finalmente, la respuesta del criticado en Verso Books. 

Not Less Than Nothing, But Simply Nothing (julio 2, 2012


If I am repelled by John Gray’s review of my two last books ('The Violent Visions of Slavoj Žižek', New York Review of Books, July 12 2012), it is not because the review is highly critical of my work, but because its arguments are based on such a crude misreading of my position that, if I were to answer it in detail, I would have to spend way too much time just answering insinuations and setting straight the misunderstandings of my position, not to mention direct false statements – which is, for an author, one of the most boring exercises imaginable. So I will limit myself to one paradigmatic example which mixes theoretical dismissal with moral indignation; it concerns anti-Semitism and is worth quoting in detail:
Žižek says little regarding the nature of the form of life that might have come into being had Germany been governed by a regime less reactive and powerless than he judges Hitler’s to have been. He does make plain that there would be no room in this new life for one particular form of human identity:
“The fantasmatic status of anti-Semitism is clearly revealed by a statement attributed to Hitler: “We have to kill the Jew within us.” … Hitler’s statement says more than it wants to say: against his intentions, it confirms that the Gentiles need the anti-Semitic figure of the “Jew” in order to maintain their identity. It is thus not only that ”the Jew is within us“—what Hitler fatefully forgot to add is that he, the anti-Semite, is also in the Jew. What does this paradoxical entwinement mean for the destiny of anti-Semitism?”
Žižek is explicit in censuring “certain elements of the radical Left” for “their uneasiness when it comes to unambiguously condemning anti-Semitism.” But it is difficult to understand the claim that the identities of anti-Semites and Jewish people are in some way mutually reinforcing—which is repeated, word for word, in Less Than Nothing—except as suggesting that the only world in which anti-Semitism can cease to exist is one in which there are no longer any Jews.
What is going on here? The above-quoted passage from Less Than Nothing immediately continues with:
Here we can again locate the difference between Kantian transcendentalism and Hegel: what they both see is, of course, that the anti-Semitic figure of the Jew is not to be reified (to put it naïvely, it does not fit “‘real Jews”), but is an ideological fantasy (“projection”), it is “in my eye.” What Hegel adds is that the subject who fantasizes the Jew is itself “in the picture,” that its very existence hinges on the fantasy of the Jew as the “little bit of the Real” which sustains the consistency of its identity: take away the anti-Semitic fantasy, and the subject whose fantasy it is itself disintegrates. What matters is not the location of the Self in objective reality, the impossible-real of “what I am objectively,” but how I am located in my own fantasy, how my own fantasy sustains my being as subject.
Are these lines not perfectly clear? The mutual implication is not between the Nazis and the Jews, but between the Nazis and their own anti-Semitic fantasy: "you take away the anti-Semitic fantasy, and the subject whose fantasy it is itself disintegrates." The point is not that Jews and anti-Semites are somehow co-dependent, so that the only way to get rid of the Nazis is to get rid of the Jews, but that the identity of a Nazi depends on his anti-Semitic fantasy: the Nazi is “in the Jew” in the sense that his own identity is grounded in his fantasy of the Jew. Gray’s insinuation that I somehow imply the need for the annihilation of the Jews is thus a ridiculously-monstrous obscenity which only serves the base motifs of discrediting the opponent by ascribing him some kind of sympathy for the most terrifying crime of the XXth century.
So when Gray writes that “Žižek says little regarding the nature of the form of life that might have come into being had Germany been governed by a regime less reactive and powerless than he judges Hitler’s to have been,” he is simply not telling the truth: what I point out is that such a “form of life” would precisely not have the need to look for a scapegoat like the Jews. Instead of killing millions of Jews, a regime “less reactive and powerless than he judges Hitler’s to have been” would, for example, transform social relations of production so that they would lose their antagonistic character. This is the “violence” I am preaching, the violence in which no blood has to be shed. It is the utterly destructive violence of Hitler, Stalin, and the Khmer Rouge, which is for me “reactive and powerless.” It is in this simple sense that I consider Gandhi more violent that Hitler:
Instead of directly attacking the colonial state, Gandhi organized movements of civil disobedience, of boycotting British products, of creating social space outside the scope of the colonial state. One should then say that, crazy as it may sound, Gandhi was more violent than Hitler. The characterization of Hitler which would have him as a bad guy, responsible for the death of millions, but nonetheless a man with balls who pursued his ends with an iron will is not only ethically repulsive, it is also simply wrong: no, Hitler did not “have the balls” really to change things. All his actions were fundamentally reactions: he acted so that nothing would really change; he acted to prevent the Communist threat of a real change. His targeting of the Jews was ultimately an act of displacement in which he avoided the real enemy—the core of capitalist social relations themselves. Hitler staged a spectacle of Revolution so that the capitalist order could survive – in contrast to Gandhi whose movement effectively endeavored to interrupt the basic functioning of the British colonial state.
Instead of boring the reader with dozens of similar examples of Gray’s misreadings, let me just mention that Gray concludes his review with a remark on the alleged “isomorphism” between contemporary capitalism and my thinking which
reproduces the compulsive, purposeless dynamism that he perceives in the operations of capitalism. Achieving a deceptive substance by endlessly reiterating an essentially empty vision, Žižek’s work—nicely illustrating the principles of paraconsistent logic—amounts in the end to less than nothing.
Anything whatsoever can be proven with such superficial pseudo-Marxist homologies—these homologies, together with Gray’s numerous tendentious distortions, are sad indications of the level of intellectual debate in today’s media. It is Gray’s work which fits perfectly our ideological late-capitalist universe: you ignore totally what the book you are reviewing is about, you renounce any attempt to somehow reconstruct its line of argumentation; instead, you throw together vague text-book generalities, crude distortions of the author’s position, vague analogies, etc.—and, in order to demonstrate your personal engagement, you add to such bric-a-brac of pseudo-deep provocative one-liners the spice of moral indignation (imagine, the author seems to advocate a new holocaust!). Truth doesn’t matter here—what matters is the effect. This is what today’s fast-food intellectual consumers crave for: simple catchy formulas mixed with moral indignation. It amuses you and makes you feel morally good. Gray’s review is not even less than nothing, it is simply a worthless nothing.
N.B. In a recent review of Less Than Nothing (Guardian, Saturday 30 June), Jonathan Rée reaches a new depth in moralistic insinuations:
[Žižek] never discusses poverty, inequality, war, finance, childcare, intolerance, crime, education, famine, nationalism, medicine, climate change, or the production of goods and services, yet he takes himself to be grappling with the most pressing social issues of our time. He is happy to leave the world to burn while he plays his games of philosophical toy soldiers.
How can someone write this about an author who recently produced a whole series of books dedicated to precisely these topics is beyond my comprehension—even in Less Than Nothing, a book on Hegel, there is an extensive discussion of socio-political problems in the books conclusion.

lunes, 2 de julio de 2012

VIII Conversatorio de la Jurisdicción Constitucional


Por Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora (jorgefabraz@gmail.com)

Para los que no estén enterados, les paso la información del VIII Conversatorio de la Jurisdicción Constitucional: Este año es en Barranquilla - en la Universidad del Norte.
http://corteconstitucional.gov.co/viiiencuentro/





 
PRESENTACIÓN
 
La Corte Constitucional tiene el gusto de invitarlos(as) al VIII Conversatorio de la Jurisdicción Constitucional “Una mirada a las regiones”, el cual se llevará a cabo los días 29, 30 y 31 de agosto del presente año, en el Coliseo Cultural de la Universidad del Norte en la ciudad de Barranquilla.
Como en años anteriores, la Corte ha diseñado un encuentro de gran nivel académico que abarcará temas jurídicos de vital importancia para el país, los cuales serán abordados por sus Magistrados, así como por conferencistas internacionales e invitados especiales que se han convocado para tal efecto.
El VIII Conversatorio de la Jurisdicción Constitucional dispondrá de 1200 cupos para los asistentes.


 La Corte Constitucional tiene el gusto de invitarlos(as) al VIII Conversatorio de la Jurisdicción Constitucional “Una mirada a las regiones”, el cual se llevará a cabo los días 29, 30 y 31 de agosto del presente año, en el Coliseo Cultural de la Universidad del Norte en la ciudad de Barranquilla.







Como en años anteriores, la Corte ha diseñado un encuentro de gran nivel académico que abarcará temas jurídicos de vital importancia para el país, los cuales serán abordados por sus Magistrados, así como por conferencistas internacionales e invitados especiales que se han convocado para tal efecto.
El VIII Conversatorio de la Jurisdicción Constitucional dispondrá de 1200 cupos para los asistentes.
 
PROGRAMA (Sujeto a cambios)

domingo, 1 de julio de 2012

Brooks sobre las publicaciones académicas

Por Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora (jorgefabraz@gmail.com)

Creo que lo había puesto antes, pero aquí la publicación oficial. Un pequeño manual para hacer la vida académica.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2084263

The Academic Journal Editor: Secrets Revealed


Thom Brooks


Newcastle University - Newcastle Law School

June 14, 2012

Forthcoming in Journal of Moral Philosophy 9(3) (2012)

Abstract:     
Academic publishing is a world filled with more mystery than revelation. Often the best advice is made available only to those lucky enough to hear it by word of mouth. This is no less true with editing academic journals. I have enjoyed the honour of launching the Journal of Moral Philosophy and serving as its editor for the last ten years. I actively sought out the best advice on a number of issues from editors serving on leading journals as well as their publishers. Despite the fact that most of the conversations focused on journals in the areas of law, philosophy, and political science, I believe that much of the general advice remains true for most disciplines.

This editorial brings together some lessons learned over the years and reveals some secrets about the trade. My purpose is to improve the information available to share best practice and offer some insight into the minds of academic journal editors. This is a task I have performed previously on the topics of publishing advice and referee guidelines that I extend now to journal editing. I begin with a brief note about my background experiences before moving to advice on how to successfully propose a new journal to a publisher. I then discuss topics such as managing a journal launch before considering advice on the effective management of submissions received and further advice on journal development.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords: editorial, academia, academic publishing, publishing, editing, advice
JEL Classification: K00
Accepted Paper Series

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